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COMMENTS 
MINDING THE GAP IN DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE LEGISLATION: SHOULD 
STATES ADOPT COURSE OF CONDUCT 
LAWS? 
Teresa Manring* 
In the United States, there is a gap between the way that sociologists, 
psychologists, legal scholars, and advocates define domestic violence and 
the way that criminal laws define domestic violence. Experts largely agree: 
domestic violence occurs when a partner exercises continuous power and 
control over the other. In this view, domestic violence occurs via a pattern of 
abusive behaviors that unfolds over time, and its manifestations include both 
physically-violent and emotionally-abusive behaviors. In contrast, criminal 
statutes throughout the United States continue to conceptualize domestic 
violence as single acts of physical violence or threats of physical violence. 
During the past several years, England and Wales, Ireland, and Scotland 
have passed laws that have attempted to bridge this gap in their own 
societies. The enactment of these laws abroad—and the fact that legislatures 
are considering similar laws in other jurisdictions, including the United 
States—provides a timely opportunity to analyze whether state legislatures 
should adopt similar laws here. 
This Comment argues that states should adopt domestic violence laws 
similar to the ones passed abroad. First, it explains why this gap between the 
criminal law and other understandings of domestic violence emerged, what 
it looks like in practice, and what its consequences are for victims throughout 
 
 * J.D., Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2021. My sincere gratitude 
to Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer, for her guidance and feedback during the initial 
drafting of this Comment. Thank you also to the members of the Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology for their thoughtful edits, comments, and support, 
especially Ryan Neu, Leah Karchmer, Natalie Barnaby, and Emily Grant.  
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their experience with the criminal justice system. Second, it draws attention 
to the ways in which both the legislature and the criminal justice system are 
growing increasingly comfortable with defining and prosecuting crimes as 
courses of conduct. Based on the conduct covered and the harm addressed 
under these already existing laws, introducing similar laws in the domestic 
violence context would be a natural next step. Third, it evaluates course-of-
conduct laws recently passed in Scotland, Ireland, and England and Wales 
that have attempted to close this gap. Finally, it recommends that states pass 
course-of-conduct domestic violence statutes, using Scotland’s law as a 
model. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the beginning, Natalie Curtis thought her boyfriend was just 
extremely attentive.1 That explained the constant phone calls and the 
 
 1 I have reconstructed Natalie Curtis’s story using quotes and reporting from Jamie 
Grierson’s and Ciara Nugent’s respective articles in The Guardian newspaper and TIME 
magazine. Jamie Grierson, ‘This Is Not Love’: Victim of Coercive Control Says She Saw Red 
Flags from Start, GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2019, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society
/2019/jan/21/this-is-not-love-victim-of-coercive-control-says-she-saw-red-flags-from-start 
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questions: “What did you eat for lunch?” “Who did you see?” But, over time, 
she noticed his behavior slowly become more alarming. He called her thirty 
to forty times per day and then became angry when she did not pick up the 
phone. He commented on what she ate. He took her things and threw them 
outside the house. He screamed at her in public: “I hate you, fuck off.” And 
he told her that his behavior was her fault. Eventually, four years into their 
marriage, he tried to force her to sell her wedding and engagement ring. 
In England and Wales, thanks to a “coercive control” law passed in 
2015, Natalie’s husband’s controlling behavior during their relationship 
constitutes a criminal offense.2 England and Wales’s law—along with similar 
legislation passed in Scotland and Ireland—has attempted to address the full 
picture of intimate partner violence.3 These laws view domestic violence as 
a pattern of behavior employed to control victims.4 In contrast, almost all 
domestic violence laws in the United States still define domestic violence as 
consisting of only one, isolated act: most often, physical violence or the threat 
of physical violence.5 
Outside the legal sphere, the understanding of domestic violence in the 
United States and these other countries is virtually the same. Sociologists, 
psychologists, legal scholars, and advocates largely agree, and have for many 
years: domestic violence occurs when one partner exercises continuous 
power and control over the other.6 Yet, despite how well-established this 
 
[https://perma.cc/34SZ-8ZFG]; Ciara Nugent, ‘Abuse Is a Pattern.’ Why These Nations Took 
the Lead in Criminalizing Controlling Behavior in Relationships, TIME (June 21, 2019, 5:00 
AM), https://time.com/5610016/coercive-control-domestic-violence/ [https://perma.cc/NS2N
-LUMU]. 
 2 See infra Section II.C. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See infra Sections I.B, II.A. Many state criminal statutes remain narrowly focused on 
physical harm or threats of physical harm. But as will be explained further infra, the type of 
conduct covered by some other statutes is broader. 
 6 See, e.g., Learn More: What Is Domestic Violence?, NAT’L COAL. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
https://ncadv.org/learn-more [https://perma.cc/N97M-VMK9] (“Domestic violence is the 
willful intimidation, physical assault, battery, sexual assault, and/or other abusive behavior as 
part of a systematic pattern of power and control perpetrated by one intimate partner against 
another.”); AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE OPINION: INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE 1 (2012), https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guidance-and-Publications/
Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/Intimate-Partner
-Violence [https://perma.cc/DL2G-6MQT] (“Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a pattern of 
assaultive behavior and coercive behavior that may include physical injury, psychologic 
abuse, sexual assault, progressive isolation, stalking, deprivation, intimidation, and 
reproductive coercion.”). Until 2019, The U.S. Department of Justice also defined domestic 
violence as “a pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to 
gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner.” Domestic Violence, U.S. 
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premise is, criminal statutes throughout the United States continue to 
conceptualize domestic violence as single acts of physical violence or threats 
of physical violence.7 
More than ten years ago, Professors Burke and Tuerkheimer analyzed 
this “gap” in American law.8 In response, they proposed model course of 
conduct statutes to close the gap.9 But no state adopted such a statute.10 The 
enactment of course-of-conduct laws abroad—and the fact that other 
jurisdictions, including in the United States, are considering similar laws11—
provides a timely opportunity to pick up where Professors Tuerkheimer and 
Burke left off and propose, again, that states define domestic violence in 
course-of-conduct terms. 
This Comment advocates for a change in the way that state criminal 
laws define domestic violence. Part I explains why this gap between the 
criminal law and other understandings of domestic violence emerged, what 
it looks like in practice, and what its consequences are for victims throughout 
their experience with the criminal justice system. Part II first draws attention 
to the ways in which both the legislature and the criminal justice system are 
growing increasingly comfortable with defining and prosecuting crimes as 
courses of conduct generally. It then suggests that, based on the conduct 
covered and the harm addressed under these already existing laws, 
introducing similar laws in the domestic violence context would be a natural 
next step. Part II proceeds by introducing and evaluating laws recently passed 
in Scotland, Ireland, and England and Wales that aimed to close this gap by 
defining domestic violence in course-of-conduct terms. Finally, Part II 
concludes by recommending that U.S. states pass similar laws, using 
Scotland’s law as a model. Part III addresses challenges and 
counterarguments to adopting and implementing course-of-conduct domestic 
violence laws in the United States. The Comment concludes by emphasizing 
that U.S. states must address the ways that transactional criminal statutes fail 
 
DEP’T JUST. (June 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/domestic-violence [https://perma.c
c/2SBZ-TCCA]. 
 7 See infra Sections I.B, II.A. 
 8 See infra Section I.B. 
 9 See infra Section I.B. 
 10 See infra Section I.B. 
 11 In April 2019, New York State Senator Kevin Parker introduced a bill that would make 
coercive control a felony. S.B. S5306, 2019-2020 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). The law defines 
coercive control as when someone “engages in a course of conduct against a member of his or 
her same family or household, without the victim’s consent, . . . which results in limiting or 
restricting, in full or in part, the victim’s behavior, movement, associations or access to or use 
of his or her own finances or financial information.” Id. 
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domestic violence victims; the best path forward is to follow the leads of 
countries that have adopted course-of-conduct laws. 
During this analysis, I use the term “domestic violence” to refer to a 
pattern of abusive and controlling behavior that occurs over time, including, 
but not limited to, physical violence.12 I use the word “abuser” to refer to the 
party attempting to exercise control over his partner. I also refer to the abuser 
as he/him and the victim as she/her.13 Finally, I refer to individuals who 
experience domestic violence as “victims.”14 
I. BACKGROUND: THE SUCCESSES OF THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT AND THE 
LIMITATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 
During the past 200 years, a radical transformation in the legal system’s 
approach to physical violence in intimate relationships has occurred. Society 
once viewed physical violence against a partner or spouse as a husband’s 
prerogative, both legally and culturally. Now, society views physical 
violence against a partner or spouse as a harm worthy of recourse. Although 
the battle to make physical intimate relationship violence a crime has been 
won, the current structure of those same criminal laws hinders prosecutors’ 
attempts to hold domestic violence perpetrators accountable and prevents 
victims from seeking and achieving recourse. 
 
 12 Much research has been devoted to understanding different types of domestic violence. 
What this paper calls “domestic violence,” other researchers have called coercive controlling 
violence and intimate terrorism. See, e.g., EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL (2007); MICHAEL 
P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM, VIOLENT 
RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE (2008). In a relationship characterized by 
this type of violence, one partner continuously exercises power and control over the other 
partner through some combination of emotional, psychological, physical, economic, and 
sexual abuse. Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Domestic Violence: Differentiation Among 
Types of Intimate Partner Violence: Research Update and Implications for Interventions, 46 
FAM. CT. REV. 476, 481 (2008). Common tactics used by a coercive controller include 
intimidation, isolation, blaming, and threats. Id. While coercive control can occur with or 
without physical violence, the severity and frequency of violence in these types of 
relationships tend to exceed that of other types. Id. at 483. And, unlike in situational couple 
violence, the vast majority of coercive controllers are men. Id. at 482. In relationships 
characterized by coercive controlling violence, victims can experience abuse so extreme that 
some scholars have compared it to torture. See, e.g., LEWIS OKUN, WOMAN ABUSE: FACTS 
REPLACING MYTHS 115–16 (1986) (“The battered woman’s situation obviously resembles that 
of a prisoner subject to thought reform” because “[l]ike brainwashed captives, battered women 
are subject to verbal abuse, beatings, other forms of physical abuse, and to confinement or 
imprisonment.”). 
 13 See Kelly & Johnson, supra note 12, at 482. 
 14 While I realize the problematic nature of this term compared with “survivor,” the tragic 
reality is that many women do not survive domestic violence. “Survivor” obscures this reality. 
“Victim” does not. 
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Section A briefly recounts the movement to criminalize domestic 
violence. Section B then explains, drawing on Professors Tuerkheimer’s and 
Burke’s scholarship, the ways in which current domestic violence statutes 
misunderstand domestic violence and inhibit criminalizing domestic 
violence as it actually occurs. 
A. HOW DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BECAME A CRIME 
Anglo-American common law created a hierarchy in the home, with the 
husband as the master.15 His power included the right to “command his wife’s 
obedience, and subject her to corporal punishment or ‘chastisement’ if she 
defied his authority.”16 Thanks to the women’s rights movement, all judges 
in the United States denounced this practice by the late nineteenth century.17 
However, courts quickly found a new doctrine that enforced male hierarchy 
in the domestic sphere: privacy.18 As one example, a North Carolina judge 
wrote that when it came to violence in the home, except in cases of permanent 
injury or “dangerous” violence, “it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the 
public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive.”19 In this way, the 
law defined domestic violence as a place where the criminal law could not—
indeed should not—reach. 
During the 1970s, the women’s movement sought to reform this area of 
the law.20 They argued that physical violence between intimate partners was 
just as serious as the physical violence that occurred in any other context and 
sought to compel courts and law enforcement to treat it that way.21 Although 
feminists challenged substantive law during this time by, among other 
strategies, petitioning states to add domestic violence statutes to their civil 
and criminal codes, many of the movement’s goals and victories were 
procedural and remedial.22 For example, in response to police departments’ 
failures to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence, activists sought to 
implement pro-arrest mandates and even mandatory-arrest policies.23 
 
 15 Reva B. Siegal, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117, 2122–23 (1996). 
 16 Id. at 2123. 
 17 Id. at 2129 (“By the 1870s, there was no judge or treatise writer in the United States 
who recognized a husband’s prerogative to chastise his wife.”). 
 18 Id. at 2120. 
 19 Id. at 2158 (quoting State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61–62 (1874)). 
 20 See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, LAURA A. ROSENBURY, DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER & 
KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 249–50 (5th ed. 
2018). 
 21 Id. at 249–51. 
 22 See id. 
 23 Id. at 251. 
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Within that context, seeking to compel state actors to enforce laws 
prohibiting physical violence that were already on the books in the domestic 
context made perfect sense.24 And thanks to those measures, physical 
violence against women in the home is now a criminal offense that, when 
reported, law enforcement and courts take more seriously. However, that 
tremendous achievement left a problematic legacy: the notion that domestic 
violence necessarily must involve physical violence. This idea has been 
entrenched firmly in the law, even while society’s understanding of domestic 
violence’s nature has continued to evolve. 
B. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS NOT AN ISOLATED INCIDENT 
The traditional framework of criminal law presents its own barrier to 
criminalizing domestic violence as it actually occurs.25 Criminal law 
conceptualizes domestic violence as discrete incidents of physical violence, 
largely ignoring motivation, history, and context.26 This is consistent with the 
traditional tenets of criminal law, which historically viewed crimes as single 
incidents that occur at discrete moments.27 Accordingly, criminal law does 
not naturally lend itself to proscribing harmful behavior that unfolds 
continuously and repeatedly over time.28 
Meanwhile, outside of the legal context, domestic violence is commonly 
defined in terms of its intent or effect—control—and the repetitive, patterned 
nature of the abuser’s conduct.29 And in the real world, an abuser’s pattern of 
behavior toward his partner is not limited to physical acts of violence or 
threats of physical violence.30 Rather, common tactics abusers use also 
 
 24 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to 
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 970 (2004) [hereinafter 
Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering] (“Confronting a legal 
apparatus wholly unresponsive to battering, domestic violence advocates focused their reform 
efforts, quite sensibly, on forcing police and prosecutors to enforce the laws already on the 
books; that is, to treat crimes ‘equally’ whether the victim and perpetrator were strangers or 
intimates.”). 
 25 Id. at 971–74. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 972. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See supra text accompanying note 6. 
 30 The Duluth Model’s power and control wheel, which collects common tactics used by 
abusers, lists controlling what the victim does, who she sees, calling her names, intimidating 
her through damage and destruction to property, preventing her from getting a job, not 
allowing her to access income and other resources, and threatening to commit suicide, among 
other tactics. Power and Control Wheel, DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, 
[hereinafter Duluth, Power and Control Wheel], https://www.theduluthmodel.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/03/PowerandControl.pdf [https://perma.cc/NCD3-JQJK]. 
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include controlling what the victim does and who she sees, verbal abuse and 
name-calling, intimidation, and economic control and coercion, among 
others. Trying to use existing criminal laws to prosecute domestic violence 
is therefore like trying “to fit the square peg of domestic violence into the 
existing round hole of the penal code.”31 
Addressing domestic violence with incident-oriented statutes conceals 
the continuous, patterned reality of abuse as many victims experience it, as 
well as the psychological and emotional abuse that occurs during the periods 
between, or in many cases instead of, occurrences of physical abuse.32 It 
ignores that physical violence, in the domestic context, occurs more than 
once the majority of the time.33 It ignores that domestic violence endures. It 
does not begin and end in seconds; it progresses, and often escalates, over 
months and years.34 
Furthermore, statutes that define domestic violence as isolated incidents 
of physical violence do not account for what motivates abusers—power and 
control. They also leave out the many other strategies that abusers use to 
control their victims. Physical violence may be an infrequent or minor 
strategy or may not be used at all.35 In fact, abusers may only become 
physically violent when they cannot control their victims by other means.36 
These statutes also ignore the root of victims’ suffering, since many victims 
describe psychological and emotional abuse as more harmful than physical 
violence.37 As Professor Tuerkheimer wrote, there is a “vast range of 
suffering—amidst and beyond the physical abuse . . . where the criminal law 
‘does not go.’”38 Domestic violence statutes do not actually address the 
reality of domestic violence; instead, they erase both abusers’ perpetration 
and victims’ experiences of it. 
The law’s misunderstanding of domestic violence leads to perverse and 
absurd consequences. For instance, criminal law, as it stands in many states, 
sees no difference between an individual who smashed a glass on a stranger 
one evening during a bar fight and an abuser who, over a period of years, 
stopped allowing his partner access to her finances, controlled how she 
 
 31 Alafair Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative 
Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552, 566 (2007). 
 32 See Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24, at 
972–74. 
 33 See supra note 12. 
 34 Burke, supra note 31, at 567–68. 
 35 Id. at 570–71. 
 36 See STARK, supra note 12, at 13–14. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24, at 966. 
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dressed, isolated her from her friends and family, verbally abused her, and 
then smashed a glass over her head when she challenged his authority. If the 
victims in both cases brought charges, prosecutors might approach the cases 
practically identically. But they are different. One is an isolated outburst of 
aggression. It starts and finishes in seconds. The other is only one tactic an 
abuser uses as part of his broader exercise of power and control over his 
victim. The smashing of the glass may have started and finished in seconds, 
but the abuse itself is continuous: it lasts for weeks, months, years. 
This misunderstanding of domestic violence creates obstacles for 
victims from start to finish in a criminal case.39 It begins with the fact that, 
after enduring abuse at her partner’s hands for years, the criminal justice 
system is only interested in the most recent incident of abuse or whichever 
incident brought the victim into the system. As such, a prosecutor may only 
ask her about that particular incident and not the long cycle of abuse she has 
suffered through.40 If the victim volunteers information about prior abusive 
behaviors, the prosecutor, relying on the laws as written, will see these 
incidents as distinct, isolated, unconnected, and only relevant if they lend 
themselves to bringing additional charges. The prosecutor might press her on 
the details: What date? What time? In which room? Did anyone else see it? 
What happened before and after? But, for victims whose abusers subject 
them to repeated, continuous abuse, it may be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to recall those details.41 
This focus on a single incident affects the charges the prosecutor can 
bring, the sentence the court can give the abuser, the evidence and arguments 
that prosecutors can present at trial, and the likelihood that a jury or judge 
convicts the abuser.42 Prosecutors must present a coherent story to persuade 
a jury.43 In the domestic violence context, such a story would recount both 
the continuous, repetitive nature of the abuse the victim has suffered, as well 
as the perpetrator’s motivations: power and control.44 But when the crime’s 
structure makes this crucial context irrelevant, prosecutors can only present 
disjointed fragments of the victim’s story in court.45 Without the context that 
 
 39 See id. at 975–89 (describing in detail the ways in which the law’s limited definition of 
domestic violence warps the criminal process for victims). 
 40 Id. at 977–80. 
 41 Id. at 979. Thus, even if the victim describes conduct that is criminal, the criminal justice 
system may still offer no recourse if she cannot remember enough details about the incident 
to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the abuse occurred. 
 42 Id. at 980–81. 
 43 Id. at 980–82. 
 44 Id. at 980–87. 
 45 See id. 
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connects these incidents, the story may leave the jury confused and 
unconvinced.46 
To solve these problems, Professors Tuerkheimer and Burke proposed 
that legislators replace our current, transactional domestic violence statutes 
with course-of-conduct domestic violence statutes.47 Course-of-conduct 
statutes allow juries to convict when they find that a defendant has engaged 
in a criminal “course of conduct”—a series of acts committed over a period 
of time that have continuity of purpose.48 In the domestic violence context, 
course-of-conduct statutes possess a number of advantages over transactional 
statutes. On a general level, because course-of-conduct statutes criminalize a 
series of acts, they may be better-suited to address crimes like domestic 
violence, which often occur as a pattern connected of behaviors. And, as I 
will explain further infra,49 course-of-conduct statutes are also well-suited to 
address some of the other shortcomings of current domestic violence 
legislation. Specifically, course-of-conduct statutes could make the 
relationship between the perpetrator and the victim relevant, reject the notion 
that physical violence is at the core of domestic violence, recognize that 
domestic violence stems from abusers’ desire to gain power and control over 
their victims, and, accordingly, allow victims greater access to justice.50 
Thus, as Professor Tuerkheimer explained, this type of statute would better 
capture the nature and harm of domestic violence and would represent “the 
next stage in the evolution of law’s growing responsiveness to harms suffered 
by women.”51 
Although Professors Tuerkheimer’s and Burke’s proposed statutes 
contained significant differences, both models reflected the repetitive, 
patterned nature of domestic violence and emphasized, in some way, the 
underlying dynamics of power and control.52 At the time, however, these 
proposals did not gain traction.  
 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 1019–22; Burke, supra note 31, at 601–03. 
 48 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW, § 3-801 (West 2002) (defining “course of 
conduct” as “a persistent pattern of conduct, composed of a series of acts over time, that shows 
a continuity of purpose”); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.225 (2017) (defining “course of conduct” as 
“a pattern of conduct composed of two or more acts . . . over a period of time, however short, 
evidencing a continuity of purpose”). 
 49 See infra Sections II.B, II.C, and II.D. 
 50 See Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24, at 
1030–31. 
 51 Id. at 1019. 
 52 See id.; see also Burke, supra note 31, at 601–02. 
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II. CHANGES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW 
Significant changes have occurred in this area of the law since 
Professors Tuerkheimer’s and Burke’s proposals. In recent years, states have 
started to modify their domestic violence statutes in ways that suggest the 
extra-legal definition of domestic violence—that is, the view that domestic 
violence is a pattern of behavior—is finally starting to seep into the legal 
sphere. At the same time, prosecuting crimes as courses of conduct is 
becoming increasingly common in the criminal justice system. In particular, 
many state laws define some crimes that frequently occur between former 
intimate partners or in otherwise intimate relationships—such as stalking, 
harassment, and sexual abuse of a child—in course-of-conduct terms. 
Meanwhile, across the pond, England and Wales, Ireland, and Scotland have 
passed and implemented legislation that defines “coercive control” of 
intimate partners as a course-of-conduct crime. 
This Part will describe and discuss these changes. Section A will discuss 
state approaches to domestic violence that, in small ways, break the mold of 
the transactional, physical-harm-focused domestic violence statutes 
discussed in Part I. It will also demonstrate how these statutes identify both 
emotional harm and controlling behavior as worthy of recourse. Section B 
will discuss course-of-conduct crimes that the criminal justice system already 
uses to prosecute behavior in contexts that bear important similarities to 
domestic violence. Section C will discuss recently passed domestic violence 
legislation in England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland and analyze the 
benefits and downsides of each of these approaches. Ultimately, this 
Comment argues that adopting a domestic violence course-of-conduct 
statute, modelled after Scotland’s law, is the best path forward. 
A. STATE CRIMINAL STATUTES RECOGNIZING EMOTIONAL HARM 
AND CONTROLLING BEHAVIOR 
Although the basic structure of U.S. domestic violence statutes has not 
changed,53 the types of conduct these statutes cover has evolved. Although 
some state criminal statutes are still narrowly focused on conduct that 
threatens or causes physical harm,54 others have taken a broader view on the 
type of behaviors that can constitute domestic violence. Examples include 
 
 53 See supra Part I. 
 54 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-918, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/title18
/t18ch9/sect18-918/ [https://perma.cc/F8H4-RW9G] (criminalizing only battery and assault); 
IOWA CODE § 236.2, https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/236.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCU
9-QAGG] (criminalizing only assault); KAN. STAT. § 60-3102, https://www.ksrevisor.org/
statutes/chapters/ch60/060_031_0002.html [https://perma.cc/CZU9-5ABJ] (criminalizing on
ly conduct causing bodily injury or causing fear of bodily injury). 
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trespass,55 harassment,56 theft,57 interfering with an emergency call,58 and 
damaging or destroying property59 (including harming pets).60 The inclusion 
of these crimes that are not physically violent in statutes defining domestic 
violence suggests that lawmakers are starting to recognize that there are 
criminal forms of domestic violence that do not cause physical harm to 
victims but that perpetrators instead intend to control and intimidate victims. 
Killing and cruelty to animals, in particular, are common techniques used by 
abusers to establish control over their victims.61 
A small number of state laws make the connection between domestic 
violence and controlling behavior even more explicit. One example is 
Colorado, which defines domestic violence as any “crime against a person, 
or against property, including an animal . . . when used as a method of 
coercion, control, punishment, intimidation, or revenge directed against a 
person with whom the actor is or has been involved in an intimate 
relationship.”62 And in Missouri, a person commits a misdemeanor when he 
or she “knowingly attempts to cause or causes the isolation of such domestic 
victim by unreasonably and substantially restricting or limiting his or her 
access to other persons, telecommunication devices or transportation for the 
purpose of isolation.”63 
Similarly, New York recently amended its domestic violence statute to 
include forms of economic abuse.64 The statute now includes identity theft, 
 
 55 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-10 (LEXIS through 2019 Legis. Sess.). 
 56 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (LEXIS through 2019 Legis. Sess.). 
 57 Id. 
 58 See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. § 720 5/12-3.5 (2011); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2016). 
 59 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-800.3 (LEXIS through 2019 Legis. Sess.). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Vivek Upadhya, The Abuse of Animals as a Method of Domestic Violence: The Need 
for Criminalization, 63 EMORY L.J. 1163, 1164 (2014) (“Abusers frequently threaten or harm 
an animal as a method of harming a human victim, or as a method of establishing control, 
gaining revenge, or coercing compliance with a particular demand.”). 
 62 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-800.3. 
 63 MO. REV. STAT. § 565.076(1)(6) (2014). 
 64 N.Y. S.B. 2625. Leg. Sess. 2019-2020 (N.Y. 2019), https://legislation.nysenate.gov/pd
f/bills/2019/S2625 [https://perma.cc/58Z7-NNQ4]. Economic abuse occurs when one partner 
limits the other’s access to financial resources. Arianne Renan Barzilay, Power in the Age of 
In/Equality: Economic Abuse, Masculinities, and the Long Road to Marriage Equality, 51 
AKRON L. REV. 323, 329 (2017). Examples include preventing or forbidding the victim to 
work, sabotaging her employment, making unilateral financial decisions, providing the victim 
with an allowance when the couple is wealthy, not allowing the victim to have her own credit 
card or bank account, stealing money, liquidating joint accounts, signing up for a credit card 
in the victim’s name, and forcing the victim to take out loans on behalf of the abuser, among 
many others. Id.; see also Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in 
Domestic Violence, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 951, 954 (2012). 
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grand larceny, and coercion as domestic violence crimes.65 The inclusion of 
economic crimes in domestic violence statutes makes the power and control 
aspect of domestic violence clear because financial abuse makes victims 
dependent on their abusers in such a direct, cognizable way. While there may 
still be some confusion in the popular imagination about “why she doesn’t 
just leave” in situations where an abuser is physically violent, where an 
abuser financially abuses a woman, the answer is clear: she does not leave 
because she cannot.66 The abuser controls the finances, making the victim 
financially dependent on the abuser, and, accordingly, she lacks the 
necessary resources to leave.67 
The bill’s history demonstrates that the New York legislature recognizes 
that power and control motivate abusers. In fact, members of the New York 
assembly justified the bill in part because “economic abuse frequently 
accompanies other forms of domestic abuse perpetrated by abusers, in the 
family violence context, to exercise power and control over their victims and 
their finances.”68 The statute itself, though, says nothing about power or 
control, and the statute’s incident-oriented structure continues to isolate 
economic abuse from other abusive behaviors.69 Extending domestic 
violence’s definition to reach behaviors such as economic abuse and harm to 
pets suggests that legislators are willing to acknowledge the reality that 
abusers use a wide range of techniques to control their victims. But without 
recognizing the patterned, repetitive nature of domestic violence and the 
underlying intent connecting these techniques, prosecutors will continue to 
handle these individual crimes in a way that ignores the larger context in 
which abuse occurs. 
 
 65 N.Y. S.B. 2625. 
 66 Appropriately, one of the stated justifications for the bill was that “[e]conomic abuse is 
a tactic commonly used by abusers to control their victim’s finances and prevent them from 
leaving an abusive relationship.” New York State Assembly Memorandum in Support of 
Legislation, N.Y. A.B. A07400 (N.Y. 2019) [hereinafter N.Y. State Assembly Memorandum 
in Support of Legislation], https://nyassembly.gov/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A0
7400&term=2013&Memo=Y&Text=Y [https://perma.cc/8QE6-2RG4]. 
 67 See Dana Harrington Conner, Financial Freedom: Women, Money, and Domestic 
Abuse, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 339, 357 (2014) (“Financial impediments play a major 
role in restricting a woman who experiences intimate partner violence from initially gaining 
freedom from the abusive relationship. Moreover, financial instability is one of the greatest 
reasons why, after gaining freedom, a woman has limited choices and may ultimately 
acquiesce to an abuser’s attempts at reconciliation.”). 
 68  N.Y. State Assembly Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note 66. 
 69 See supra Part I.B. 
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There is, however, one state criminal statute that does recognize that 
domestic violence can occur as a pattern of connected behaviors.70 
Washington state’s sentencing guidelines allow for more severe sentencing 
of domestic violence perpetrators where an ongoing pattern of physical, 
sexual, or psychological abuse is part of their criminal conduct.71 The 
guidelines also allow for harsher sentencing when the defendant’s conduct is 
“deliberately cruel.” Although this language relates to sentencing and does 
not define domestic violence itself, it may be the closest any state law gets to 
acknowledging how abusers carry out domestic violence and what motivates 
them. 
First, the sentencing guidelines recognize that domestic violence—in its 
view, more severe iterations—involves more than a single incident, or even 
a series of one-off, unconnected, transactional offenses. The choice of the 
word “pattern” in the guidelines implies that what drives the higher 
sentencing is not only the number of incidents, but also that these incidents 
are connected. Furthermore, the guidelines reject the notion that domestic 
violence is limited to physical violence and open the door for courts to 
consider evidence of abuse that courts would not otherwise consider relevant 
or admissible. They do this by defining the pattern to include not just physical 
and sexual abuse, but also psychological abuse, and by allowing for harsher 
sentences when the defendant is deliberately cruel. 
For example, in State v. Durall,72 the Washington Court of Appeals 
upheld a trial court’s finding of an ongoing pattern of psychological abuse 
where Durall treated his wife of twelve years, Carolyn, in ways that were 
“controlling and extremely jealous.”73 Durall took Carolyn’s credit card, 
went through her wallet, forbade her from opening a separate bank account, 
 
 70 Although this Comment focuses specifically on the criminal law, it is worth mentioning 
that the definition of domestic violence as a pattern of behavior appears to be making its way 
into noncriminal statutes. As one example, in September 2020, Hawaii passed a law adding 
“coercive control” to its definition of “domestic abuse.” Melena Ryzik & Katie Benner, What 
Defines Domestic Abuse? Survivors Say It’s More than Assault, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/22/us/cori-bush-fka-twigs-coercive-control.html?referrin
gSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/ZR47-AH9U]. The law defines “[c]oercive control” 
as “a pattern of threatening, humiliating, or intimidating actions, which may include assaults, 
or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten an individual [including] a pattern of 
behavior that seeks to take away the individual’s liberty or freedom and strip away the 
individual’s sense of self . . . .” H.B. 2425, 30th Legis. Sess. (Haw. 2020). But the new 
definition only applies to laws pertaining to insurance policies and domestic abuse protective 
orders—not the criminal law. See id. 
 71 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.99.100(1)(b) (2010), https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx
?cite=10.99.100 [https://perma.cc/X3Q2-63G3]. 
 72 No. 47928-8-I, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 711 (Wash. Ct. App. May 5, 2003). 
 73 Id. at *10. 
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monitored her phone calls and email account, and did not let her leave his 
side during social events.74 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court admitted 
into evidence letters Carolyn had written describing Durall’s behavior and 
testimony from Carolyn’s friends and coworkers.75 Carolyn herself could not 
testify; Durall had murdered her.76 
Similarly, in State v. Zatkovich,77 the Washington Court of Appeals 
upheld the trial court’s finding of an ongoing pattern of psychological abuse 
where Zatkovich engaged in a number of “assaultive, harassing, and 
stalking” behaviors that caused “fear and mental torment” in the victim—his 
ex-wife Christy.78 His abusive behaviors included, on various occasions, 
visiting Christy’s house at three o’clock in the morning, turning off her 
home’s heating, forcing her car off the road, and threatening to cut her throat 
and watch her bleed to death.79 Additionally, in considering whether 
Zatkovich’s behavior was deliberately cruel enough to justify an aggravated 
sentence, the court noted that, on one occasion, Zatkovich left Christy on the 
side of the road and then told her son that she was dead.80 The court also 
emphasized that Zatkovich hit Christy while she was pregnant and told her 
that he wished that she and her baby were dead.81 Then, shortly after she gave 
birth, he threatened to kill himself and her children.82 
The Washington Court of Appeals’ analyses in Durall and Zatkovich 
make clear that the degree of an abuser’s criminal culpability does not have 
to be rooted in physical violence. Furthermore, the range of evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearings in Durall and Zatkovich provides a 
glimpse into the type of story a prosecutor could tell at trial if domestic 
violence laws made the periods before, between, and after incidents of 
physical violence relevant. The details about Durall taking Carolyn’s credit 
card and not allowing her to leave his side at parties, and Zatkovich’s 
abandoning of Christy on the side of the road and threatening to kill himself 
point directly to their respective attempts to control their victims. But 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at *1. In the days after Durall murdered Carolyn, he told their children that their 
mother had suddenly and deliberately abandoned them. Id. at *12. On appeal, Durall contested 
the trial court’s ongoing pattern of psychological abuse finding, arguing that his behavior was 
“merely indicative of a dysfunctional relationship.” Id. at *10. The court rejected this defense. 
Id. 
 77 52 P.3d 36 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 78 Id. at 38. 
 79 Id. at 41–42. 
 80 Id. at 42. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
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ultimately, like transactional domestic violence statutes, Washington’s 
sentencing statute omits this crucial context from the trial stage. 
There is an additional problem with the sentencing statute. A finding of 
“deliberate cruelty” requires that “the cruelty must be of a kind not usually 
associated with the commission of the offense in question.”83 However, in 
Zatkovich, the instances the court mentioned as examples of “excessive 
cruelty” were, in fact, part and parcel of domestic violence. Threatening to 
kill oneself and threatening to take the children are common techniques 
abusers use to control their victims. 84 Furthermore, some research suggests 
that, rather than being exceptional, pregnant women are at least as likely to 
experience domestic violence than women who are not pregnant, if not more 
likely.85 This is not to suggest that this behavior was not deplorable, or that 
the harm to the victim was not severe, but rather that the abuser’s behavior is 
not exceptional given how common these types of abusive tactics are. A 
domestic violence statute that makes context relevant would reveal this, since 
it would become apparent at the trial stage that domestic violence frequently 
includes the type of cruelty the Zatkovich court found to be exceptional. 
Overall, the statutes above represent a step in the right direction. They 
constitute a formal, legal recognition that domestic violence is not confined 
to the physical, and, in the Washington example, even that domestic 
violence’s “patterned” nature makes it unlike some other forms of violence. 
Additionally, they suggest that messages from social scientists and others 
may be slowly getting through to lawmakers. But, functionally, because they 
largely do not integrate intent and repetition into the definition of the crimes, 
these statutes continue to omit the dynamics of power and control that are 
central to domestic violence. Accordingly, having seen that traditional, 
transactional crimes do not adequately describe or remedy domestic 
violence’s harm, I will next consider course-of-conduct crimes, which might 
provide a solution. 
B. COURSE OF CONDUCT CRIMES 
Recall that the criminal law has a clear preference for defining crimes 
as discrete, singular incidents.86 There are some crimes that break this mold. 
Course-of-conduct crimes allow juries to convict when they find that a 
 
 83 Id. (citations omitted). 
 84 See Duluth, Power and Control Wheel, supra note 30. 
 85 Beth A. Bailey, Partner Violence During Pregnancy: Prevalence, Effects, Screening, 
and Management, 2 INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 183, 184 (2010). 
 86 See supra Section I.B. 
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defendant has engaged in a criminal “course of conduct”—a series of acts 
over a period of time that have continuity of purpose.87 
The justifications for defining crimes in a course-of-conduct manner are 
various and crime-specific. Generally, though, legislatures create course-of-
conduct crimes to fill gaps left between the criminal code’s collection of 
discrete, separate crimes. For example, when Congress passed the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), it addressed a gap in 
the enforcement of enterprise or group crime.88 Although RICO may be the 
most well-known course-of-conduct crime, framing criminal offenses in this 
way has become a fairly common way to define crimes that occur within the 
context of familial and intimate relationships. Stalking, harassment, sex 
trafficking, private torture, and sexual abuse of a child are all examples. This 
Section will demonstrate that domestic violence bears important similarities 
to other course-of-conduct crimes that the law already recognizes, both in 
terms of the problems they were passed to address, and in terms of the nature 
of the crimes themselves. The existence of these crimes suggests that 
prosecutors are familiar enough with course-of-conduct crimes that the 
creation of another would not be problematic or confusing to apply. Stalking 
and sexual abuse of a child statutes are particularly important to this analysis, 
as they address “gaps” in the law that are most similar to the gap that exists 
in the domestic violence context. 
1. Stalking 
Stalking laws differ state by state, but, generally speaking, they 
criminalize a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause 
a reasonable person to feel fearful, intimidated, or suffer serious emotional 
distress.89 The statutes generally do not specify the precise type of conduct 
that the perpetrator must engage in, nor do they focus on the stalker’s intent. 
In addition, no state stalking statute requires that the victim suffer physical 
harm, and the vast majority reject the notion that fear of physical violence is 
the only type of fear that deserves recourse.90 Prosecutors generally do not 
 
 87 See, e.g., M.D. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW, § 3-801 (West 2002) (defining “course of 
conduct” as “a persistent pattern of conduct, composed of a series of acts over time, that shows 
a continuity of purpose”); MO. Rev. STAT. § 565.225 (2017) (defining “course of conduct” as 
“a pattern of conduct composed of two or more acts . . . over a period of time, however short, 
evidencing a continuity of purpose”). 
 88 See Burke, supra note 31, at 589–90; see also Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and 
Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24, at 1020–21, 1021 n.329. 
 89 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-A (1995), http://www.mainelegislature.
org/legis/statutes/17-a/title17-asec210-a.html [https://perma.cc/BVD2-7PMX]. 
 90 But see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3(A) (West 2016) (requiring that the victim fear 
death, sexual assault, or bodily injury to herself or to a family member). 
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bring stalking charges when the case involves current intimate partners.91 
Nonetheless, of the two crimes analyzed in this Section, stalking is the most 
similar to domestic violence. Stalking and domestic violence are similar in 
terms of conduct, context, the involved parties’ identities, and the distinct 
type of harm they cause. Most importantly, they are similar in that 
transactional criminal statutes cannot cover the full extent of their conduct or 
the harms they cause.92 
The rationale and context behind passing stalking laws apply in full 
force in the domestic violence context. Until the early 1990s, prosecutors 
prosecuted stalking behaviors that now constitute part of a course of conduct 
of stalking individually, usually as misdemeanors.93 These included 
harassment, menacing, loitering, trespassing, and terroristic threatening.94 As 
one scholar wrote at the time, there was a “gap in the law, leaving victims of 
stalking without an adequate legal recourse against their pursuers. Stalking 
laws represent a new attempt to fill this void.”95 Scholars additionally 
observed that criminalizing these offenses separately—even when they 
occurred repeatedly and offenders directed them at a particular person—
demonstrated that “legislators failed to recognize the commonality between 
the behaviors . . . .”96 Similarly, as we have seen, domestic violence statutes 
treat incidents where one partner threatens or physically harms the others as 
isolated, when in fact, because these incidents are rooted in one intimate 
partner’s attempt to control the other, they are inherently connected to a range 
of other harmful behaviors.97 
Before legislatures enacted stalking laws, the law did not recognize that 
repeated stalking behaviors, directed at a particular person, triggered harm 
that was both greater than and distinct from the harm caused by the isolated 
perpetration of these individual crimes.98 Similarly, as Evan Stark has written 
in the domestic violence context, “sheer repetition is not the issue.”99 Instead, 
the issue is that the abuser is harming the same person over and over again, 
 
 91 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Breakups, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 55–58 (2013) 
[hereinafter Tuerkheimer, Breakups]. 
 92 See id. at 52 (“In its approach to stalking, the law adopts a model of crime that, 
nomenclature aside, seems more closely aligned with the realities of domestic violence.”). 
 93 Kathleen G. McAnaney, Laura A. Curliss & C. Elizabeth Abeyta-Price, 
From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 819, 824 (1993). 
 94 Id. at 821 (citations omitted). 
 95 Robert A. Guy, Jr., The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 991, 1000 (1993) (footnotes omitted). 
 96 Id. at 906. 
 97 See supra Sections I.B, II.A. 
 98 McAnaney, Curliss & Abeyta-Price, supra note 93, at 883. 
 99 STARK, supra note 12, at 94. 
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“giving abuse a cumulative effect that is far greater than the mere sum of its 
parts.”100 Furthermore, “minor” stalking behaviors can culminate in acts of 
horrendous violence against victims. But when the law viewed those 
behaviors as isolated and unconnected, it could not intervene in any 
protective way until an attack actually occurred.101 Similarly, laws that 
conceptualize domestic violence as isolated incidents rather than patterns of 
behavior fail to recognize that abuse escalates, and, accordingly, that the 
danger to victims grows. 
Stalking and domestic violence are also similar in terms of the parties’ 
identities, the conduct perpetrators engage in, and the effects that conduct has 
on victims. Stalkers are often their victims’ former intimate partners, seeking 
to establish or reestablish control over their victims.102 Although states 
prosecute stalking as if it cannot occur between current intimate partners, in 
fact, stalking behaviors can begin at the start of a relationship, and domestic 
violence can continue during and after the breakup.103 Thus, stalkers are often 
abusers and vice versa. 
Examining the behaviors and tactics that stalkers and abusers employ 
makes this clear.104 Unwanted telephone calls and communications, 
spreading rumors, threats, spying, and following victims all occur in both the 
stalking and domestic violence contexts. For instance, an abuser may follow 
the victim throughout the house and demand to know what she is doing, or, 
when she is outside the home, demand to know her whereabouts.105 Recent 
innovations in surveillance technology have further conflated these two 
crimes, as both abusers and stalkers use surveillance and tracking devices to 
pursue, intimidate, and control their victims.106 
 
 100 Id. 
 101 Guy, supra note 95, at 999. 
 102 See Tuerkheimer, Breakups, supra note 91, at 54. 
 103 Id. at 55–58. 
 104 A 2009 report from the U.S. Department of Justice notes that common stalking 
behaviors include making unwanted phone calls and communicating with victims in other 
unsolicited ways, spreading rumors, and following or spying on victims. KATRINA BAUM, 
SHANNAN CATALANO, MICHAEL RAND & KRISTINA ROSE, BUREAU JUST. STATS., STALKING 
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 1 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/si
tes/default/files/ovw/legacy/2012/08/15/bjs-stalking-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VRZ-APDZ]. 
 105 See Tuerkheimer, Breakups, supra note 91, at 60–61. 
 106 See, e.g., Kate Lyons, Stalkers Using Bugging Devices and Spyware to Monitor 
Victims, GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/
feb/13/stalkers-using-bugging-devices-and-spyware-to-monitor-victims [https://perma.cc/D2
XD-JDK5] (reporting that stalkers are using apps and other bugging devices to monitor their 
victims); Aarti Shahani, Smartphones Are Used to Stalk, Control Domestic Abuse Victims, 
NPR (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/09/15
/346149979/smartphones-are-used-to-stalk-control-domestic-abuse-victims [https://perma.cc
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However, even though the two crimes bear clear similarities, stalking 
laws cannot perfectly fill the gaps in domestic violence law. For one thing, 
prosecutors generally do not use stalking laws to prosecute domestic 
violence.107 For another, stalking laws may not reach all types of abuse that 
domestic violence victims experience. As an example, stalking laws likely 
would not cover economic abuse—one of the most common strategies 
abusers employ. And finally, one important function of the criminal law is 
that it expresses and codifies what society condemns.108 Using stalking laws 
to prosecute domestic violence, especially given those laws’ stranger and 
post-breakup connotations, leaves a question as to whether society also 
condemns abuse that occurs between persons in a relationship. 
Accordingly, in stalking laws, the criminal law already recognizes a 
crime that features conduct and harms similar to those in the domestic 
violence context. The introduction of a course-of-conduct domestic violence 
statute would therefore not introduce a type of crime with which the criminal 
justice system is not already familiar. 
2. Sexual Abuse of a Child 
A second crime that bears important similarities to domestic violence is 
sexual abuse of a child. California’s legal treatment of this crime is 
particularly relevant since it criminalizes “continuous” sexual abuse of a 
child, defined as three or more acts of sexual conduct with a child under the 
age of fourteen during a three month period or more.109 Prosecuting child 
molesters presents evidentiary challenges that are similar to those faced by 
prosecutors of domestic violence.110 The California statute, in particular, 
addresses the specific problem of children who have been sexually abused 
 
/35DG-J9NS] (reporting that abusers are using apps and other digital tools to follow and 
monitor their victims). 
 107 See Tuerkheimer, Breakups, supra note 91, at 71. Professor Tuerkheimer made this 
observation in 2007, but I have found no evidence that prosecutors have started using stalking 
laws to prosecute domestic violence since then. 
 108 See Henry Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 
(1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction . . . is the judgment of community 
condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”). 
 109 CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5(a) (1872) (amended 2006), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.go
v/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=288.5.&lawCode=PEN [https://perma.cc/
X6FT-3SZL]. 
 110 See Brian Bah, Jury Unanimity and the Problem with Specificity: Trying to Understand 
What Jurors Must Agree About by Examining the Problem of Prosecuting Child Molesters, 91 
TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2013) (“[Child sexual abuse] statutes are meant to battle a difficulty 
in convicting child molesters: many of these cases revolve around alleged repeated sexual 
abuse with only generic evidence available since the child in question has difficulty providing 
event-specific evidence.”). 
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repeatedly by adults but cannot remember the specific dates on which the 
assaults occurred or recall other significant details related to the assaults. In 
response to this problem, the statute does not require the jury to unanimously 
agree on the same three predicate acts.111 Instead, the jury must only agree 
that three acts of sexual abuse occurred.112 
California courts have also applied this logic to domestic violence cases, 
reasoning that both involve repetitive conduct, “[b]oth the victim of spousal 
and of child abuse are likely to be unwilling to report their abuse to the 
authorities due to fear of physical and/or emotional retaliation on the part of 
the attackers[,]” and “[b]oth patterns of behavior are based on controlling 
another individual through violence.”113 Although the California Court of 
Appeals in that case did not mention it, domestic violence victims face 
similar difficulties in recalling specific incidents of abuse.114 Accordingly, 
conceptualizing domestic violence as a course-of-conduct crime may help to 
address this common evidentiary obstacle. 
C. RECENTLY PASSED INTERNATIONAL LAWS 
The United States is, of course, far from the only country where a gap 
in domestic violence law exists. In recent years, though, other countries and 
jurisdictions have introduced and passed legislation to fill this gap. 
Specifically, England and Wales, Ireland, and Scotland have all passed 
criminal laws to address the limitations of transactional, physical-harm 
focused statutes. In advocating for and passing these laws, government 
officials and law enforcement have explicitly cited a number of the concerns 
discussed in this Comment. In particular, the goals of these new laws 
included linking the government’s definition of domestic abuse to the 
 
 111 § 288.5(b). 
 112 Id. 
 113 People v. Thompson, 160 Cal. App. 3d 220, 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 114 See Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24, 
at 979 (“The patterned, on-going nature of domestic violence makes [recalling specific 
incidents of abuse] an often insurmountable obstacle. Given the dynamics of what has been 
endured, it is not surprising that domestic violence victims tend to blend, generalize and 
summarize when narrating a history of abuse.”). 
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criminal law’s,115 recognizing that emotional abuse can be as harmful or more 
harmful than physical abuse,116 and closing a perceived gap in the law.117 
1. English Law 
As in the United States, the English criminal justice system historically 
criminalized domestic violence through general criminal offenses that 
prosecutors and courts applied in the domestic violence context.118 
Accordingly, a similar gap existed under English law in 2014, when 
lawmakers floated the idea of new domestic violence legislation. 
Before passing the new law, the Government consulted with voters to 
determine the public’s thoughts on the potential law.119 Initially, there was 
some question of whether an offense specifically focused on domestic 
violence was necessary.120 Some survey respondents suggested that the 
legislature should instead adapt harassment and stalking laws for domestic 
violence purposes.121 Ultimately, though, the British Parliament decided to 
create a separate offense, specifically tailored to address coercive controlling 
violence.122 
Important to the lawmakers’ approach to crafting the new legislation 
was their separation of physical violence from other forms of domestic 
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erma.cc/5NEB-W2PE]. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 7. 
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abuse.123 A report from the Home Office stated that there was “no need for 
greater clarity around violent behaviours, which are effectively criminalised 
through existing offenses.”124 
The 2015 law—passed as a section of the “Serious Crime Act 2015”—
reads as follows: 
A person (A) commits an offence if – 
A repeatedly or continuously engages in behavior towards another person (B) 
that is controlling or coercive, 
At the time of the behavior, A and B are personally connected 
The behavior has a serious effect on B, and 
A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect on B.125 
The statute specifies that A and B are personally connected if they are 
in an intimate relationship, live together and are family members, or live 
together and have previously been in an intimate relationship.126 A “serious 
effect” means that it “causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence 
will be used against B,” or that, “it causes B serious alarm or distress which 
has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities.”127 A 
person convicted of the offense will receive a fine, up to five years in prison, 
or both.128 
What the law chooses not to define, or leaves out altogether, is just as 
important as these definitions. The law does not define “controlling” or 
“coercive.”129 It does not specify gender, nor does it include a statute of 
 
 123 See STRENGTHENING THE LAW ON DOMESTIC ABUSE—A CONSULTATION, supra note 
115, at 11. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015
/9/pdfs/ukpga_20150009_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DLL-W2L9]. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See id. Statutory guidance from the Home Office, however, states that “[c]ontrolling 
behaviour is: a range of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by 
isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal 
gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and 
regulating their everyday behaviour.” HOME OFFICE, CONTROLLING OR COERCIVE BEHAVIOUR 
IN AN INTIMATE OR FAMILY RELATIONSHIP: STATUTORY GUIDANCE FRAMEWORK 3 (2015), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/482528/Controlling_or_coercive_behaviour_-_statutory_guidance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YC96-U47A]. It further defines “coercive behaviour” as “a continuing act 
or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used 
to harm, punish, or frighten their victim.” Id. But the guidance also emphasizes that this is 
“not a legal definition.” Id. 
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limitations.130 Finally, as already mentioned, although one could interpret the 
statute to cover physical violence because “behavior” is such a broad term, 
the Act’s history suggests that Parliament did not intend for it to do so.131 I 
will analyze the English law below, alongside my analysis of Ireland and 
Scotland’s laws. 
2. Irish Law 
Three years after the British Parliament passed the Serious Crime Act, 
Ireland passed the Domestic Violence Act 2018. In addition to expanding 
access to protection orders and introducing protections to domestic violence 
victims during court proceedings, the Act introduced a new criminal offense, 
which, like England and Wales’s, was called “coercive control.”132 The first 
section of the offense reads: 
(1) A person commits an offence where he or she knowingly and persistently engages 
in behaviour that— 
(a) is controlling or coercive, 
(b) has a serious effect on a relevant person, and 
(c) a reasonable person would consider likely to have a serious effect on a relevant 
person.133 
The Irish offense is very similar to the English version that proceeded 
it, but it features at least three significant differences. The first is that the 
mens rea requirement differs significantly from England and Wales’s Serious 
Crime Act, which considers what the defendant knew or ought to have known 
with regard to the effect of his or her behavior. The Domestic Violence Act, 
however, raises the mens rea requirement to “knowingly.”134 Additionally, 
what perpetrators must know differs between the two laws. Under the English 
law, the perpetrator must either have known or ought to have known that his 
behavior would “have a serious effect on” his victim. On the other hand, 
although the Domestic Violence Act’s wording is somewhat ambiguous, it 
appears to require that the prosecutor prove that an offender actually knows 
 
 130 See id. 
 131 See STRENGTHENING THE LAW ON DOMESTIC ABUSE—A CONSULTATION, supra note 
115, at 11 (explaining that English law does not require “greater clarity around violent 
behaviours, which are effectively criminalised through existing offences”). 
 132 Domestic Violence Act 2018, (Act. no. 6/2018, § 39) (Ir.). 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
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that his behavior is controlling or coercive.135 This requirement places a high 
burden of proof on prosecutors.136 
The second difference is that, unlike England and Wales’s Serious 
Crime Act, Ireland’s Domestic Violence Act explicitly incorporates physical 
violence into the offense. Section 40 of the Act stipulates that where an 
offender’s “coercive control” involves violence or a threat of violence, courts 
shall treat that fact as an aggravating factor and the sentence will increase 
accordingly.137 In this way, Ireland’s Domestic Violence Act improves the 
English law because it acknowledges that abusers may seek to gain control 
over their victims through both physically violent and nonphysically violent 
behaviors as part of the same course of conduct. Still, by providing for greater 
sentencing where physical violence exists, Ireland’s law also sends a clear 
message that physical violence is more blameworthy, more harmful, or both 
than other controlling behavior. This conflicts with many victims’ 
experiences.138 
Finally, Ireland’s Domestic Violence Act does not stipulate how many 
acts it requires to prove the offense, only that the offender must engage in 
“persistent” behavior.139 Although leaving room for interpretation and 
prosecutorial discretion is not necessarily a bad thing, without at least a 
minimum number of acts, it is difficult to understand how prosecutors can 
bring these cases with certainty that they have gathered sufficient evidence. 
3. Scottish Law 
The third and most recently passed law is the Domestic Abuse 
(Scotland) Act 2018 (“Domestic Abuse Act”). Leading up to the Act’s 
passage, a Committee Report noted that the drafters intended the law to 
address concerns that the criminal law did not cover the lived experiences of 
many domestic violence victims.140 The committee sought to address these 
concerns “by recognising . . . domestic abuse as a course of conduct taking 
place over a period of time, rather than the focus being on a single incident, 
 
 135 See id. 
 136 See Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24, 
at 1022 (“[P]rosecutors would understandably balk at a requirement that intentional mens rea 
be proven with respect to the exercise of power and control. The difficulty of convincing jurors 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a batterer consciously intended to dominate his victim may be 
practically insurmountable.”). 
 137 Domestic Violence Act 2018, (Act. no. 6/2018, § 40) (Ir.). 
 138 See STARK, supra note 12, at 13–14. 
 139 Id. 
 140 STAGE 1 REPORT ON THE DOMESTIC ABUSE (SCOTLAND) BILL, supra note 116, at 3. 
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as is ordinarily the case with the criminal law.”141 Furthermore, in contrast to 
the drafters of the English and Irish statutes, the drafters of Scotland’s 
Domestic Abuse Act intentionally used a “gendered analysis” of domestic 
violence in framing the law.142 The drafters’ starting point was, in essence, 
“the view that women and girls are at increased risk of violence and abuse by 
nature of their gender, from men.”143 The law itself, however, uses gender 
neutral terms. The law reads: 
(1) A person commits an offence if— 
(a) the person (“A”) engages in a course of behaviour which is abusive of A’s partner 
or ex-partner (“B”), and 
(b) both of the further conditions are met. 
(2) The further conditions are— 
(a) that a reasonable person would consider the course of behaviour to be likely to cause 
B to suffer physical or psychological harm, 
(b) that either— 
(i) A intends by the course of behaviour to cause B to suffer physical or psychological 
harm, or 
(ii) A is reckless as to whether the course of behaviour causes B to suffer physical or 
psychological harm.144 
The law further stipulates that “psychological harm” includes fear, 
alarm, and distress.145 It defines “behaviour which is abusive” as including 
violent, threatening, or intimidating behavior, as well as behavior that “has 
as its purpose (or among its purposes)” one or more of the following effects: 
“(a) making B dependent on, or subordinate to, A, (b) isolating B from 
friends, relatives or other sources of support, (c) controlling, regulating or 
monitoring B’s day-to-day activities, (d) depriving B of, or restricting B’s, 
freedom of action, [or] (e) frightening, humiliating, degrading or punishing 
B.”146 
Abusive behavior under the law includes behavior that “would be 
considered by a reasonable person to be likely to have one or more” of the 
above effects.147 The law defines behavior broadly as “behaviour ‘of any 
 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, (ASP 5) § 1, ¶¶ 1–2, https://www.legislation.g
ov.uk/asp/2018/5/part/1/enacted [https://perma.cc/PDS3-4XBW].  
 145 Id. § 1, ¶ 3. 
 146 Id. § 2, ¶¶ 2–3. 
 147 Id. § 2, ¶ 2(b)(ii). 
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kind’ that may include communicating something . . . or failing to 
communicate or do something.”148 Additionally, “[b]ehaviour directed at a 
person” includes both conduct toward that person’s property and conduct that 
makes use of a third party.149 
4. The Scottish Law as a Model for State Legislation 
Scotland’s Domestic Abuse Act provides the best model for states to 
use when drafting their own laws because the Scottish law solves a number 
of the problems presented by the English and Irish laws. One important 
feature of the Scottish law is that, like the Irish law, Scotland’s Domestic 
Abuse Act explicitly incorporates physical harm into the offense.150 This is 
significant because including physical harm along with other controlling 
behaviors represents a more accurate and complete understanding of how 
abusers abuse their victims, as well as how domestic violence victims 
experience that abuse.151 
Furthermore, the Scottish statute does not require that the prosecutor 
prove that the victim suffered any harm, nor does it require proof that abusers 
gained control over their victims.152 This means that, rather than proving the 
victim’s suffering, the prosecutor—and the jury—must focus on the alleged 
abuser’s behavior. In contrast, requiring prosecutors to prove the abuse’s 
“effect” on the victim, as the Irish law does, is problematic because the 
degree of agency that domestic violence victims retain in the face of abuse 
should not diminish the abuser’s culpability.153 Instead, the Domestic Abuse 
Act requires the prosecutor to prove that a reasonable person would view the 
 
 148 Id. § 10, ¶ 2. 
 149 Id. § 10, ¶ 3. 
 150 Id. § 2, ¶ 4. Drafters explained this decision in a report released before the law’s 
passage: “The Scottish Government took the decision to include both physical and 
psychological abuse within the new offence in order to enable prosecutors to include all acts 
of abuse in a single charge as evidence of a course of conduct, rather than having to bring a 
separate charge for the physical aspect of the abuse.” STAGE 1 REPORT ON THE DOMESTIC 
ABUSE (SCOTLAND) BILL, supra note 116, at 6. 
 151 See supra Section I.B. 
 152 Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, (ASP 5) § 4, ¶ 1. (“The commission of an 
offence . . . does not depend on the course of behaviour actually causing B to suffer harm of 
the sort mentioned in section 1(2).”). 
 153 See Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24, 
at 1022 (“[Requiring proof that the victim was controlled] is problematic from an evidentiary 
perspective, as it suggests (or at least does not preclude) that the victim must be completely 
subordinated for the defendant to be convicted. It is also troubling phenomenologically, since 
a focus on the victim’s domination will tend to obscure evidence of agency.”). 
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abuser’s behavior as likely to cause the victim to suffer physical or 
psychological harm.154 
The Scottish law’s scienter requirement is also less burdensome on 
prosecutors than the English law’s. Though the English law appears to 
require the prosecutor to prove that an offender knew that his behavior was 
controlling or coercive,155 the Scottish law requires that the prosecutor prove 
that an abuser intentionally or recklessly caused the victim to suffer physical 
or psychological harm.156 As mentioned above, the specificity of the English 
law’s scienter requirement will likely make it far more difficult for 
prosecutors to prove the crime and perhaps deter them from bringing charges 
at all.157 This difficulty stems from the fact that abusers may not actually 
know that their behavior is controlling or coercive. And, even if abusers do 
understand the precise nature their behavior, it is not obvious what sort of 
evidence a prosecutor could present to prove this knowledge, particularly 
when most other criminal statutes do not require such a specific showing of 
scienter. Proof of an intention to cause harm, on the other hand, is already 
required under various existing criminal statutes.158 And the Scottish law’s 
requirement that the offender must only be “reckless” as to whether his 
conduct causes the victim to suffer physical or psychological harm reduces 
the burden of proof on prosecutors even further. 
One additional benefit of Scotland’s Domestic Abuse Act is that it is far 
more detailed and specific than the English and Irish laws. The law’s specific 
definition of “abusive behavior,” as well as its specific enumeration of the 
 
 154 Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, (ASP 5) § 2, ¶ 2. The drafters explain: “It is the 
Scottish Government’s view that proving a crime was committed should not hang on 
demonstrating in court that the complainer suffered harm. The Scottish Government considers 
that this reduces the likelihood of the trial process being traumatic for the victim (by forcing 
them to ‘re-live’ the experience of the abuse in order to establish that the crime was 
committed). It also means that the fact that a particular individual was resilient in the face of 
the abuse is of no relevance to the prosecution case. Instead, the focus is on what the accused 
actually did (or failed to do), on whether they had the requisite mental element of recklessness 
or intent, and on an objective assessment of what the outcome for the victim would likely have 
been.” STAGE 1 REPORT ON THE DOMESTIC ABUSE (SCOTLAND) BILL, supra note 116, at 7. 
 155 See Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/20
15/9/pdfs/ukpga_20150009_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DLL-W2L9]. 
 156 Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, (ASP 5) § 1, ¶ 2(b). 
 157 See Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24, 
at 1022 (“[P]rosecutors would understandably balk at a requirement that intentional mens rea 
be proven with respect to the exercise of power and control. The difficulty of convincing jurors 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a batterer consciously intended to dominate his victim may be 
practically insurmountable.”). 
 158 One example is battery. In Wisconsin, for instance, an offender can be convicted of 
battery if they “cause[] bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm 
to that person or another . . . .” Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1) (2020). 
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relevant effects on the victim, give Scottish citizens—including police, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges—a much clearer picture as to who 
this law is meant to protect and from what it is meant to protect them.159 In 
contrast, the Irish and English laws do not elaborate on “behavior” at all. 
Finally, the Scottish law also makes clear how many incidents of abuse 
prosecutors must demonstrate to prove the crime occurred: two.160 As 
mentioned above, providing prosecutors with clear guidelines about what the 
offense involves as well as the number of incidents the law requires them to 
prove is crucial to the crime’s implementation and success. Accordingly, the 
Scottish law provides the best model for states to use when drafting course-
of-conduct domestic violence legislation. 
III. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
Although the Scottish law is the best solution, it is not perfect. Important 
and valid questions about the intersection of domestic violence and the 
criminal justice system remain. More specifically, one might question 
whether the criminal justice system is the most appropriate way to address 
domestic violence in our society at all. This Part will address this concern. 
In recent years, many scholars have questioned both the efficacy and the 
morality of relying on the criminal law to address domestic violence. Some 
point to the system’s continued reliance on incarceration in the domestic 
violence context as a feminist failure.161 In particular, scholars point to 
mandatory arrest laws,162 no-drop policies,163 and other practices designed to 
increase enforcement of domestic violence laws as having the unanticipated 
and unfortunate effect of undermining the victim’s autonomy.164 
 
 159 See Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, (ASP 5) §§ 1–2, ¶ 4. 
 160 Id. § 10, ¶ 4. 
 161 See, e.g., Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 748 (2007) 
(“By embracing harsh criminalization policies, domestic violence reformers actually strayed 
from the underlying values of the feminist movement.”); LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED 
MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 1–6 (2012) (criticizing dominance 
feminists’ strategy of relying on the state to address and protect women from domestic 
violence and arguing that the legal system’s response to domestic violence “has proven 
problematic for many women”); Leigh Goodmark, Should Domestic Violence Be 
Decriminalized?, 40 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 53, 70–88 (2017) (detailing critiques of the 
criminalization of domestic violence and arguments for decriminalization). 
 162 Mandatory arrest laws require law enforcement to arrest alleged abusers. Justine A 
Dunlap, Soft Misogyny: The Subtle Perversion of Domestic Violence “Reform,” 46 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 775, 793 (2016). 
 163 No-drop policies require prosecutors to pursue charges against abusers without 
consideration for whether survivors support the bringing of these charges. Id. at 797–98. 
 164 See, e.g., id. at 792–809 (chronicling ways these and other criminal justice policies 
have had negative consequences for domestic violence survivors). 
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Furthermore, in a country that is currently struggling under the burden of 
mass incarceration, calling for legislatures to create new criminal offenses—
particularly ones that may lead to higher sentencing—may be rightly met 
with skepticism. 
But while feminist concerns about mass-incarceration generally and 
criminalizing domestic violence specifically are well-taken, there are 
important reasons to criminalize domestic violence, and there could be 
serious consequences if legislatures do not. The first reason is that domestic 
violence in its patterned, ongoing forms, involves the subjugation of another 
person. It is a sustained deprivation of another person’s agency and liberty.165 
This feature of domestic violence makes it different from other conduct our 
laws define as criminal, such as drug possession, which, in theory, only 
directly injures the possessor and could only indirectly injure others.166 It 
seems uncontroversial to say that crimes perpetrators commit to subjugate 
and control other individuals cause greater social harm and are therefore 
more worthy of retribution and deterrence than crimes that do not. Thus, 
domestic violence is distinct from other criminal behaviors—such as drug 
possession—that have been rightly criticized for both excessive sentencing 
and over-criminalization. 
Second, while some critics of the criminal justice system and criminal 
law in general might find its underlying goals of retribution and deterrence 
misguided, even ignoring these justifications, the goals of incapacitation and 
isolation are highly important in the domestic violence context. If the system 
does not separate abusers from victims, victims remain at risk.167 This is 
particularly true given abusers’ tendency to repeatedly abuse a particular 
victim in a way that escalates over time.168 
 
 165 See STARK, supra note 12, at 15 (“What is taken from [victims] . . . is the capacity for 
independent decision making in the areas by which we distinguish adults from children and 
free citizens from indentured servants. [Domestic violence] entails a malevolent course of 
conduct that subordinates women to an alien will by violating their physical integrity . . . , 
denying them respect and autonomy (intimidation), depriving them of social connectedness 
(isolation), and appropriating or denying them access to the resources required for personhood 
and citizenship (control).”). 
 166 See Alexandra Michelle Ortiz, Invisible Bars: Adapting the Crime of False 
Imprisonment to Better Address Coercive Control and Domestic Violence in Tennessee, 71 
VAND. L. REV. 681, 711 (2018). 
 167 Id. at 712. (“Incarceration also allows a victim adequate time to escape safely, both 
physically and mentally. In short, incarceration is the best way to ensure that the abuse stops, 
contributing significantly to the goal of saving women’s lives.”). 
 168 Id. (“Because domestic violence by its nature is cyclical and repetitive—marked by 
continued violence by the same offender—these concerns [about reoffending and escalating 
abuse] are perhaps more relevant in the domestic violence context than many other crimes, 
making the case for incarceration in this context particularly strong.”). 
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Finally, as long as domestic violence statutes remain on the books, they 
should accurately capture both abusers’ conduct and victims’ harm.169 
Current domestic violence statutes do not. These statutes’ accuracy is 
important because of the criminal law’s expressive function: our criminal 
statutes not only reflect behavior that society already condemns, but also 
prescribe behavior that society should condemn. In this way, criminal statutes 
shape societal understandings of what is and is not permissible conduct and 
communicate to victims that the harm they have suffered is real and of the 
kind that society will not tolerate.170 A consequence of the law incorrectly 
defining domestic violence, then, is that society continues to misunderstand 
what domestic violence is, how it occurs, and why it is harmful. These 
omissions in our current laws, therefore, have real consequences for both 
victims and society at large. Said differently, “what the law quietly calls legal 
becomes, or remains, socially legitimate.”171 Accordingly, though criminal 
justice reforms are important and necessary, this is not the area reformists 
should target. 
CONCLUSION 
Domestic violence statutes in the United States are changing in ways 
that suggest the legal field is ready to grapple with a more realistic 
understanding of domestic violence and its perpetration. Despite these 
improvements, however, the structure of U.S. domestic violence statutes, 
which still define domestic violence as an isolated event, remains flawed. 
Accordingly, the United States should follow the lead of countries that are 
addressing the ways that transactional criminal statutes fail domestic 
violence victims. The best path forward is for states to pass legislation 
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